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Property of A. taken on an execution against B. is not in the legal possession of
the court issuing the execution (unless, perhaps, where there is a mandate to levy on
the specific goods). Therefore the fact that property is levied upon by the United
States marshal, under an execution from a United States court against B., does not
prevent A. from maintaining his title by replevin in a state court.
Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450, and Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wall. 334, distinguished.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
CAMPBELL, J.-IMrs. Heyman, the plaintiff, sued defendant in
replevin for certain goods, which, as we understand the finding,
the court below held were unlawfully taken from her by defendant, but nevertheless gave judgment in his favor. Defendant, at
the time the goods were replevied, held them as United States deputy marshal, under an execution issued from the Circuit Court of
the United States for the Western District of lichigan, against
one Adolph Heyman, who was plaintiff's husband. There are no
legal conclusions set out in the finding, and there are some facts
set out, which would seem to indicate that there were questions
discussed concerning the validity of plaintiff's title. We have
had some doubt whether the court below did not err in failing to
find more specifically as requested. But the facts actually found
show title in plaintiff and show nothing to controvert it. We shall
assume, therefore, what has been assumed by counsel for both parties, that the ground of the decision was, that defendant's possession, though wrongful, must prevail over state process, issued in
favor of the real owner. And we shall consider the record as
involving the question, whether the United States maxr*shal, by
seizing the property of a stranger to the execution in his hands,
can cut off the right of the owner to recover his property thus
wrongfully seized. For the right is effectually cut off if it cannot
be replevied in the state court, when there is no remedy provided
by law for trying the title anywhere else.
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The case supposed to stand in the way of this remedy is Free.
man v. Howe, 24 How. 450. The language of that case does,
when taken by itself, tend to sustain the claim of the defendant,
and if it were applicable here, and not affected by subsequent
decisions, we should be disposed (as stated in Carew v. Mathkews,
41 Mich. 476) to regard it as perhaps disposing of the case. But
when this decision is considered in the light of other decisions,
which are recognised as binding in the United States courts, we
think it has no force when applied to the issue before us. The
only ground of the decision was, that the property there in controversy was in the custody of the United States court, for legal
purposes, and that an effectual remedy existed in that court to
try and determine the rights of the adverse claimant. If this was
so, there was little room for discussion. The remedy there suggested was a bill in equity, which it was said would not be treated
as a separate suit, but only as a collateral proceeding in the same
suit. And reference was there made to some other cases in which
the question decided was, not whether one jurisdiction could interfere with another, but whether the remedy in equity was a proper
remedy to protect the particular rights in controversy. In Freeman v. Howe, there can be little doubt that there was a remedy
in equity so far as the subject-matter was concerned, for the complaining parties were railroad mortgagees in trust, and the property replevied by them was taken in that capacity against a levy,
not by execution but under mesne process.
There was certainly some force in the suggestion that the remedy was there adequate, and the fact that the property was in the
custody of the court was assumed. Possibly that is true in some
cases, in regard to property held under mesne process. But such
has not been the view concerning property held under final process,
and it has been uniformly held that a marshal is a trespasser, and
in no way protected by his process when he seizes the property of
a stranger.
In Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wall. 834, the action was trespass, and
therefore, all that was said about other remedies was obiter. But
it was distinctly intimated that the difficulty did not arise, except
concerning property actually or constructively in the possession
of the court, and while litigation was still pending. Property
under mesne process is in some cases the only basis of jurisdiction.
and it is often subject to disposition for various purposes pendente
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lite, so that it may not only be discharged from seizure, but may
sometimes be dealt with otherwise. This creates at least a colorable if not a real distinction, and may give some force to the claim
that it is in the custody of the court, although we are not prepared
to say the distinction is usually in fact very important. The case
of Buck v. Colbath is significant in confining the doctrine of conflict to interference with the action of courts, and in holding that
a marshal who levies on the property of a stranger is in no sense
acting under process, unless the writ directs the seizure of the specific property taken. The distinction between writs against specific
property and those against undescribed property of 'named persons
is made the turning point. And it was said emphatically that the
plaintiff in error is mistaken when he asserts that the suit in the
federal court drew to it the question of title to the property, and
that the suit in the state court against the marshal could not withdraw that issue from the former court. No such issue was before
it, or was likely to come before it, in the usual course of proceeding in such a suit.
In the subsequent case of McKee v. Bains, 10 Wall. 22, it was
held that a trespass suit by a third person against a marshal could
not be removed into a court of the United States, because his levy
could not be regarded as made under any authority of the United
States. This is certainly equivalent to holding that he is no better
off than if he had no process, and it is difficult to conceive how it
leaves any room for holding that a disturbance of his wrongful
possession is an interference with the court.
It would not be, we suppose, competent for Congress or any
state, even by positive enactment, to deprive the owners of property of the right to vindicate their title by legal process in a judicial trial. There is no legislation which provides any method
whereby Mrs. Heyman could secure her rights in the United States
court against Covell. Unless she has such a remedy in due form
of law her only resort must be to the state courts, and this is
recognised in McKee v. Rains, as well as in Slocum v. Mayberry,
2 Wheat. 2. It was indeed held, in Freeman v. Howe, that equity
orould relieve in that particular instance, and it was said that it
would, in any case of wrongful levy on a third person's goods. If
this were so, the case would not be difficult of redress. But it has
since been held that there is no such remedy. In Van Norden
v. Morton, 99 U. S. 378, a bill in equity was filed in the Circuit
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Court of the United States for the district of Louisiana, to secure
protection and restoration against a marshal's levy under an execution from the same court, and the Circuit Court made such a
decree. But on appeal to the United States Supreme Court it was
held, that replevin was the proper remedy to regain possession, or
some similar proceeding in the nature of a common-law replevin,
and that equity had no jurisdiction. The decree was reversed for
want of jurisdiction, without prejudice to an action at law or other
redress.
If there is no remedy by bill in equity, then it follows that a
common-law action is the proper redress, and such an action can
only be brought in a court of the United States where the parties
are such as, to confer jurisdiction; and in such cases, the statutes
have made the jurisdiction concurrent with power of removal,
under certain circumstances. In the present case, it does not
appear that suit could have been brought anywhere but in the
state court, and the case has gone to judgment in the usual course.
We think there was no ground for refusing redress to plaintiff,
and that she was entitled to judgment on the finding.
Judgment must be reversed with costs, and judgment entered
for plaintiff with nominal damages of six cents.
COOLEY, J.-My brethren may be right in their view that the
later decisions of the Federal Supreme Court have, in effect, overruled Buck v. Colbath, but I prefer to await an authoritative
declaration to that effect, by the court itself.
Rus.-Whenever property has been
seized by an officer of a court, by virtue
of its process, the property is to be considered as in the custody of that court,
and under its control for the time being,
and no other court has a right to interfere with that possession, unless it be
some court which may have a direct
supervisory control over the court whose
process has first taken possession, or
some superior jurisdiction in the premises: Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wall. 341 ;
Peck v. Jenness, 7 How. 625; The Oliver Jordan, 2 Curt. 415; Brown v.
Carke, 4 How. 4; The Robert ulmton, 1
Paine 621 ; Keating v. Spink, 3 Ohio
St. 105. Taylor v. Carryl, 2o How.

583; Hagan v. Lucas, 10 Pet. 400;
Afunsen v. ltarroun, 34 Ill. 422 ;
Samuel v. Agnew, S0 Id. 556 ; Parker
v. Smith, 3 Bradw. (II.) 356.
REAsONS.-With regard to cases involving seizures made on land or water
for breach of laws of the United States,
the statute conferring upon the federal
courts exclusive jurisdiction of such
cases, forms in itself sufficient reason
for the existence and enforcement of the
rule ; and in criminal cases, as where a
federal court, for example, is asked to
issue a writ of habeas corpus to bring
before it one committed under state process, the denial of the writ rests upon
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u nder it, could not divest the authorities
of their authority over the
of the state
and of the two sales made, one
essel;
under or by color of the authority of the
)y the sheriff and one by the marshal,
United States." But the rule rests ultihe sale by tile sheriff must be considered
mately upon broader foundations than
is conveying the legal title, and the sale
statutory provisions. Its objects are the
by the marshal as inoperative: Taylor
prevention of unseemly contests for the
v. Carrgl, 20 How. 583; and see Keatmere possession of persons or property,
ing v. Spink, 3 Ohio St. 105; The
and above all else, the avoidance of danRoyal Saxon, 1 Wall. Jr. 311.
gerous conflicts between the state and
And where the marshal, by virtue of
nationai authorities: Hagan v. Lucas,
mesne process issuing out of the United
10 Pet. 400; The Oliver Jordan, 2 Curt.
States Circuit Court, attached certain
415; The Robert Fulton, 1 Paine 626;
railroad cars, which were afterwardi
and see Keating v. Spink, 3 Ohio St.
taken out of his hands by the sheriff,
120 ; Pec v. Jenness, 7 How. 625.
under a replevin brought in a state court
by mortgagees of the railroad company,
ILLUSTRATIVE CASs.-The conflict
the proceedings of the sheriff were held
has most frequently arisen between the entirely irregular: Freeman v. Howe, 24
state and federal courts. In Slocum v.
How. 450.
.1Mayberry, it was held, that the courts
The rule protects property seized unof the United States having exclusive
der execution, as well as that seized by
jurisdiction of all seizures made on land
virtue of an attachment; and this is
or water for a breach of the laws of the true, though the officer making the first
United States, any intervention of a seizure release the property on bail or by
state authority, which, by taking the taking a forthcoming bond for it. The
thing seized out of the hands of the taking of the bond does not release the
United States officer, might obstruct
property. It does not work a substituthe exercise of this jurisdiction, is un- tion of the bond for the property and
lawful, and the right of the owner to
leave the latter liable to process from
bring replevin in a state court for a vesanother court. Thus, in Hagan v. Lusel seized for an attempted violation of
cas the sheriff seized property under a
embargo laws, was denied: Slocum v.
valid process from a state court, and deMlayberry, 2 Wheat. 2.
livered it on bail to abide a trial of the
In the case of the ship Robert Fulton, right to the property and its liability to
it was held, that a warrant of attachment
the execution. The same property was
from the Admiralty could not be lawthen seized by a marshal, under a federal
fully executed, and that the United
execution against the same defendant;
States District Court could not proceed
but it was held that the first levy, whein rein, a state court having already ac- ther under federal or state process, and
quired jurisdiction by a previous levy
notwithstanding the bond was taken,
of an attachment upon the vessel: The withdrew the property from the reach
Ship Robert Fulton, 1 Paine 620 ; and
of the process of the other court, and
see The Oliver Jordan, 2 Curt. 415.
that the marshal took nothing by his
In Taylor v. Carryl it was held, that
levy: Hagan v. Lucas, 10 Pet. 400;
where a vessel had been seized under
see Wfisuall v. Sampson, 14 How. 52;
process of foreign attachment issuing
Palliam v. Osborne, 17 Id. 471 ; Booth
from a state court, and a motion was
v. Ableman, 3 Wallace 344; s. c. 7
pending in that court for an order of
Minn. 104, 314; Peale v. Phpps, 14
sale, a libel filed in a federal court for How. 368 ; and see Munson v. lHarroun,

the statutory prohibition against issuing
it save where the prisoner is "in custody

marine:'s

wages, and process issued
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34 Ill. 422, and Parker v. Smith, 3
Bradw. (Ill.) 356, in which it was held
that a state court will not interfere with
the execution of fiual process from a
federal court for the protection of a
stranger alleging that his property had
been tortiously seized in execution to
satisfy the debt of another.
The possession of a receiver, a trusWe or a sequestrator in chancery (there
are many cases on this point; see, however, Wistrall v. Sampson, 14 How. 52 ;
Peale v. Phipps, Id. 368), and the possession of an executive officer of the
government is likewise protected from
interference. Thus, the right to levy an
attachnent, issued out of a state court,
upon imported merchandise in the custody of United States officers, but not
entered at the custom-house, has been
denied: Harris v. Denie, 3 Pet. 292.
And a United States District Court,
proceeding in bankruptcy, cannot oust
a state court of jurisdiction over the
bankrupt's property previously attached
by it: Peck v. Jenness, 7 How. 612.
Criminal cases are likewise within the
scope of the rule. Thus, neither the
Supreme nor any other federal court can
issue a habeas corpus to bring before it,
for any other purpose than to testify, a
prisoner who is in custody under sentence or execution of a state court: EX
parte Dorr, 3 How. 103 ; see Ex purte
Robinson, 6 McLean 355, where instances
aregiven sustaining the above ; and see
United States v. Booth, 21 How. 523.
COxFLICTING CASES.-In

Slocum v.

Jfayberry, a United States officer seized
a vessel for an attempted violation of
embargo laws. Finding a cargo on
board, he refused on demand to deliver
It to the owner, who brought replevin
for it against him in a state court.
The vessel only was seized; the cargo
was not taken or held under federal or
any other process. To bring replevin
in a state court for the cargo was, therefore, not an interference with property

in possession of a federal court, because
that court dlid
not have possession of the
property, and the thderal Supreme Court
sustained the right to replevy it in a
state court, but, however, expressly denied the right to replevy the 'essel in
the state court : Slocum v. fayben'y," 2
Wheat. 2. It is plain that the couffict
in this case is only apparent and not
real. The cargo was not in poss'ession
of a federal court, and therefore not
within the rule protecting it from interference.
Basing their decisions upon this case,
the Supreine Courts of New Jersey and
Indiana, respectively, decided that where
a United States marshal, under process
from a federal court against A., seizes
the goods of B., the latter may replevy
them in a state court : Bruen v. Ogden,
11 . J. L. 371 ; l1anna v. Steinberger,
6 Blackf. 520. But it is conceived that
these cases are readily distinguishable
from Slocum v. l 1ayberry, in which
there was no interlirence by a state
court with property in possession of a
federal court. There was such an interferenee, however, in the other cases.
The property replevied in those cases
had been actually seized by a marshal,
acting under valid federal process.
The cases of Dunn v. Vail and Gilman v. Williams, also afirmn
the right
of a stranger, whose property has been
tortiously seized under federal process,
to replevy it in a state court: Dunn v.
Vail, 7 Mart. (La.) 416; Gilman v.
Williams, 7 Wis. 329. The conflict in
these four caseb is real and not merely
apparent.
In Minnesota, the rule stated at the
head of this note was followed, but
reluctantly and with some adverse criticism. The court, after remarking that
the object of the rule is the avoidance
of a conflict between courts, says :
"Whether this evil may be greater than
that of always compelling a party in
these cases to resort to the court out of
which the process issued, upon which his
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property nas been seized, to assert his
legal rights, may well be questioned."
This objection to the rule does not seem
entitled to much weight. If the decision of Freeman v. Howe is sound and
be not overruled, the enforcement of the
rule does not deprive the person, whose
property has been wrongfully seized, of a
competent tribunal in which to assert
his rights. Besides his remedy in the
federal court, he may maintain an action
against the marshal for the trespass in
wrongfully seizing the goods, and this
action may be brought in a state court,
for it is the possession of the property by
the court, and not the protection of its
officers in tortious seizures, which the
rule seeks to secure. Trespass or any
other action, which does not disturb
the possession of the court, may be
brought in a state court against the
officer, whether he be marshal, sheriff or
other federal or state official : Buck v.
Colbath, 3 Wall. 334.
Admitting that the possession of the
officer be wrongful and illegal, the question is: What tribunal shall decide
whether it is so or not ? If a state court
so decides and takes the thing seized out
of the hands of the officer, this is in
effect a decision by a state court, that the
federal couit has no jurisdiction over the
property. But it seems settled that to
the federal courts alone belong the determination of questions touching their
own jurisdiction. Quoting a remark of
Chancellor KENT, that "if a marshal
of the United States, under an execution
in favor of the United States against A.
should seize the person or prop.sty of
B., then the state courts have jurisdiction to protect the person and the
property so illegally invaded," (Kent
Com., vol. 1, p. 410), Mr. Justice NELsoNr in Freeman v. Howe, says: " No
doubt, if the federal court had no jurisdiction of the case, the process would be
invalid, and the seizure of the property
illegal, for which the aggrieved party is
entitled to his remedy. But the question
VOL. XXIX.-23

is, which tribunal, the federal or state,
possesses the power to determine the
question of jurisdiction or validity of the
process? The effect of the principle
stated by the chancellor, if admitted,
would be most deep and extensive in its
operation upon the jurisdictioti of the
federal court, as a moment's consideration
will show. It would draw after it into
the state courts, not only all questions
of the liability of property seized upon
mesne or final process, issued under the
authority of the federal courts, including
the admiralty, for this court can be no
exception, for the purposes for which
it was seized, but also the arrests
upon mesne and imprisonment upon
final process of the person in both
civil and criminal cases, for in every
case the question of jurisdiction could be
made ; and until the power was assumed
by the state court and the question of
jurisdiction of the federal court was
heard and determined by it, it could not
be known whether in the given case it
existed or not. We need scarcely re
mark that no government could main
tain the execution of its laws, civil oi
criminal, if the jurisdiction of its judicial tribunals were subject to the determination of another :" Freeman v. Howe,
24 How. 459.
In the case of the United States v.
Booth, Booth was imprisoned under a
warrant of commitment from a federal
court and a habeas corpus was issued by
a state court, which decided that the detention of Booth by the federal authorities was illegal and discharged him. The
United States Suprere Court reversed
this decision and Chief Justice TAwEY

said : "But after * * * the state judge
or court (is) judicially apprized that the
party is in custody under the authority
of the United States, they can proceed
no further. They then know that the
prisoner is within the dominion and jurisdiction of another government, and that
neither the writ of habeas corpus, nor any
other process issued under state author-
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ity can pass over the line of division between the two sovereignties. He is then
within the dominion and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. If he has
committed an oflnee against their laws,
tleir tribunals alone can punish him, if lie
is wrongfully imprisoned, their tribunals
can release him and afford him redress."
II
* * No judicial process whatever
form it may assume, can have any lawful authority outside of the limits of the
jurisdiction of the court or judge, by
whom it is issued; and an attempt to
enforce it beyond these boundaries is
nothing less than lawless violence :"
United States v. Booth, 21 How. 523.
There seems to be no distinction taken
in the cases sustaining the rule, as to
mesne, or final, or civil process ; persons
or property held under either are equally
within the scope and protection of the
rule, and this whether tile seizure or
arrest be rightful or wrongful, legal or
illegal.
But in Michigan, in Carewv. M4athews,
it was held that replevin will lie in a
justice's court to recover property wrongfully seized on federal process by a
United States marshal. In this case,
however, Judge COOLEY (who it is observable, does not entirely concur in
the decision in the principal case), denied the application of tle rule, and held
replevin before tie justice maintainable
because, since the amount in controversy
was below tile jurisdictional limit of the
federal court, the plaintiff was remediless, unless allowed to sue in a state tribunal.
And he further says: "It
might be very proper and suitable to
provide by statute some method in which
one whose property has been seized on
an execution against the property of
another might have it released immediately on giving a forthcoming bend, or
might have his claim summarily tried.
But no such method is now provided.
If the owner under such circumstances
would recover his property in specie, he
must res)rt to replevin. Take away

his right to bring replevin, and however
inadequate it may be in some eases, he
is limited to the remedy in damages. In
many cases this would be utterly inadequate. And there is not a sentence or
line in Freeman v. Howe, which affords
any countenance to the doctrine that the
federal court must hold exclusive jurisdiction of such a case, when from the
circumstances it is incompetent to give
ile
same full and effectual redress that
the state courts may afford :" Carew v.
Matthews, 41 Mich. 576.
The federal Supreme Court in 'an
Norden v. Morton, 99 U. S. 378, affirmed
the right to maintain replevin against tie
marshal in a state court, and denied that
there was any remedy in equity in the
United States court. But none of the
cases holding the contrary doctrine were
referred to, and it does not appear that
counsel called the attention of the court
to them. It seems remarkable, to say
the least, that the court should overrule
Freeman v. Howe, and the other cases
sustaining the rule, without once alluding
to tle reason upon which it rests, or to
the decisions by which it was established.
The principal case follows Van Norden v. Morton. But the reason of the
rule, the avoidance of a conflict between
the federal and state judiciaries, is not
discussed. But four of tie cases touching the subject were cited by the court
(or from all that appears from the report), broughtto its notice. And it may
be questioned whether the Supreme
Court of the United States would sustain Van Norden v. Morton, if the point
came again before it and received fuller
argument and more careful consideration.
The reason of the rule, the prevention
of an embarrassing conflict between
courts, applies as well to cases where
a stranger's property is seized as to
any other. But the remedy of the
stranger on the equity side of the federal court would, certainly in some cases,
be more expensive and inconvenient than
replevin in a state court, and it is not
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lunmated that in equity he can secure
tha immediate return in specie of the
property upon bond being given as in
replevin. The court, in Freeman v.
Hiowe, thought that the remedy afforded
in equity was more effectual than replevin.
The question is not free from difficulty,
and the state of the decisions is such as
to make it hazardous to say whether
the conflicting cases would be overruled and their conclusions declared unsound law, were the question to come
squarely before the United States
Supreme Court, or whether they would
be sustained, and the rule stated at the
head of this note declared inapplicable
to cases where, under process against one
person, the property of another, a stranger to the writ, has been seized.

Supreme Court: Day v. Gallup, 2 Wall.
197 ; Buck v. Colbath, 3 Id. 341.
And the rule is confined in its operation to the parties before the court, or
who may, if they wish to do so, come
before it and have a hearing for the protection of their interests. Strangers
to the original suit, whose property has
been tortiously seized, or any one interested in the possession of property in the
custody of a federal court, may by petition or bill on the equity side of the
court make themselves, so far parties to
the proceedings in which the property
has been wrongfully taken, as to have
their interests protected, and this is true,
although the persons representing adverse interests in such case, do not possess the qualifications of citizenship
necessary to enable them to sue each
LIMITATIONS OF THE RuLE.-The other in the federal courts ; such a suit
right of interference by courts having is not an original suit, but is ancillary,
direct supervisory control over the court dependent and supplementary merely to
whose process has first taken possession, the original suit, out of which it has
or by some superior jurisdiction in the arisen, and it is maintainable without
premises, is admitted by the terms of the reference to the citizenship or residence
rule itself. And it is only while the of the parties: Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wall.
property is in possession of the court, 345 ; Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450.
The power of the court upon the bill,
either actually or constructively, that the
court is bound or professes to protect is not limited to a case between parties
that possession from interference by other to the original suit; any party may file
courts. Whenever the litigation is ended, the bill whose interests are affected by
or the possession of the officer or court the suit at law: Freeman v. Hou'e, 24
is discharged, other courts are at liberty How. 460, and cases cited.
to deal with it according to the rights of
RETUn.-A sheriff or marshai, findthe parties before them, whether those
rights require them to take possession of ing property upon which lie seeks to make
the property or not. In such cases no a levy already in possession of an officer
contest arises about the mere possession, of another court acting under its proand no conflict but such as may be de- cess, should return that such is the fact,
cided without unseemly and discreditable and not seek to deprive the first officer
collision. Thus in Dayv. Gallup, the of his possession: The Robert Fulton,
property attached had been sold and the I Paine 620.
attachment suit ended when the attaching officer and his assistants were sued,
and the federal Supreme Court held that
such suit in a state court, commenced
after the proceedings in the federal couit
had ben concluded, raised no question
or the jurisdiction of the United States

RE-3EDIs.-But where property in
possession of an officer of one court is
by him surrendered to, or is actually
seized and taken from him by, an officer
acting under process from another court,
Besides
there are several remedies.
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the remedy by trespass or trover already
alluded to, the officer surrendering the
property is liable to the creditor : Keating v. Spink, 3 Ohio St. 105; and
the officer receiving or seizing the property may himself release the levy and
return the property: Weber v. Henry,
16 Mich. 460; and the court issuing
the second process has power to compel
a restoration of the property to the

officer who surrendered it, or fron"
whom it was taken, and it should exercise this power by ordering a return Booth v. Ableman, 16 Wis. 460. Or tie
court from whose possession the property
was taken, may enforce its return by attachment for contempt or other summary process : Slocum v. Mayberry, 2
Wheat. 2.
M. D. E

Supreme Court of Iowa.
McCLEARY v. ELLIS.
A conveyance in fee-simple-cannot contain a valid condition in restraint of alienation.
If the grantor parts with the fee it makes no difference that the conveyance is to
one grantee for life and another in remainder. A condition in restraint of alienation,
either voluntary or involuntary, of the life-estate, is void.
Land conveyed to A. for life, with remainder over to his children, with a condition
that A.'s interest shall not be sold either by him or his creditors, is nevertheless
liable to execution by A.'s creditors.
Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U. S. 716, distinguished.

ACTION by plaintiff, against one of the defendants, as sheriff,

who had sold, under execution against plaintiff, plaintiff's interest
in certain land conveyed to him by his father, to restrain such
defendant from executing to the purchaser at the sale, another
defendant, a sheriff's deed. Plaintiff claimed in his petition that
by a condition in his father's deed to him, the land could not be
alienated and was not liable to be sold for his debts. To the petition defendants demurred, but the purchaser offered to release from
the operation of the sale the homestead to which plaintiff was
entitled by law. The court below sustained the demurrer, from
which plaintiff appealed.
The deed to plaintiff contained the following abendum clause:
"To have the above-described lands his lifetime and to go to his
children at his death; but if he dies without children, then the
above-described land to go to his brother, George McCleary, and
at his death to go to his brother's children, that is, George McCleary's children; but if George dies without children, it is to go
to his sister's children. It is expressly understood that he shall
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not part with it, nor sell it, nor shall any person sell it for him, or
ior any debts whatsoever."

Hoffman, Pickier & Brown, for appellant.
Tatlock J. Wilson, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
DAY, J.-From an examination of the deed of Alvam McCleary,
it is evident that it conveyed a fee-simple estate. The conveyance
is of a life-estate to John McCleary, the remainder to his children;
but if he should die without children, to his brother George and
his children, and if George should die without children, the remainder to his sister's children. The conveyance is of a life.estate
and a vested remainder in fee: 4 Kent's Com. 203. No reversionary interest is retained in the grantor. He has disposed of
his entire estate in fee. The disposition of the estate is to the
beneficiary direct, without the intervention of trustees.
The question in this case is, can the grantor of the fee impose
restraints upon alienation ? Littleton, in sect. 360, states the doctrine upon this subject as follows: "If a feoffment be made upon
the condition that the feoffee shall not alien the land to any one,
this condition is void; because when a man is enfeoffed of lands
or tenements, he hath power to alien them to any person by the
law. For if such condition should be good, then the condition
should oust him of all the power which the law gives him, which
should be against reason, and therefore such a condition is void."
Commenting upon this Lord COKE says: "And the like law is of
a devise in fee, upon condition that the devisee shall not alien, the
condition is void; and so it is of a grant, release, confirmation, or
any other conveyance whereby a fee-simple doth pass. For it is
absurd and repugnant to reason that he that hath no possibility to
have the land revert to him should restrain his feoffee in fee-simple
of all power to alien. And so it is if a man be possessed of a lease
for years, or of a horse, or any other chattel, real or personal, and
give or sell his whole interest and property therein upon condition
that the donee or vendee shall not alien the same, the same is void;
because his whole interest and property is out of him, so as he
hath no possibility of a reverter, and it is against trade and traffic,
and bargaining and contracting between man and man; and it is
within the reason of our author that it should ouster him of all
power given to him." Coke Litt. 223 a.
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The case of Afandlebaum v. McDonell, 29 Mich. 78, containl
a very elaborate and exhaustive consideration of this question. In
that case a devise for life was made to the widow of the testator,
remainder in fee to his sons and grandson, with a restriction upon
alienation during the life of the widow, if she remained unmarried,
and until the grandson, who was then four years old, should attain
the age of twenty-five. The restriction upon the right of alienation
was held void. In announcing the opinion of the court, CHRISTIAN cY, J., employs this language: "If there is any English decision
since the statute quia emptores, where the point was involved, in
which it was, held competent for a feoffor, grantor or -devisor of a
vested estate in fee-simple, whether in remainder or possession, by
any condition or restriction in the instrument creating it, to suspend all power of the feoffee, grantee or devisee, otherwise competent to sell, for a single day, I have not been able to find it, and
the able counsel for the defendants, whose research nothing of this
kind is likely to escape, seem to have been equally unsuccessful."
And further: "We are entirely satisfied there has never been a
time since the statute quia emptores, when a restriction in a conveyance of a vested estate, in fee-simple, in possession, or remainder, against selling for a particular -period of time, was valid by
the common law; and we think it would be unwise and injurious
to admit into the law the principle contended fbr by the defendant's
counsel, that such restrictions should be held valid if imposed only
for a reasonable time." "It is safe to say that every estate depending upon such a question would, by the very fact of such a
question existing, lose a large share of its market value. - Who can
say whether the time is reasonable until'the question 'has been
settled in the coirt of last resort ? And upon what standard of
certainty can the court decide it? Or aepenaing, as it must, upon
all the peculiar facts and circumstances of each particular case, is
the question to be submitted to a jury? The only safe rule of
decision is to hold, as I understand the common law for ages to
have been, that a condition or restriction which would suspend all
power of alienation for a single day, is inconsistent with the estate
granted, unreasonable and void."
For another case, containing a most exhaustive consideration" of
this question, see .DePeyster v. Michael, 6 N. Y. 467. In this
case, after a very full review of the authorities, upon page 497, it
is said: "Upon the highest legal authority, therefore, it may be
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affirmed that in a fee-simple grant of land a condition that the
grantee shall not alien, or that he shall pay a sum of money to the
grantor upon alienation, is void, upon the ground that it is repugliant to the estate granted."
In Bradley v. -Peixoto,3 Yes. Jr. 324, it is said: "I have looked
into the cases that have been mentioned, and find it laid down as a
rule, long ago established, that where there is a gift with a condition inconsistent with and repugnant to such gift, the condition is
wholly void. A condition that the tenant in fee shall not alien is
repugnant." See, also, Brandon v. Bobin8on, 18 Yes. Jr. 429;
McCullough v. Gilmore, 11 Penn. St. 370.
In Vincent v. Watson, 19 Penn. St. 96, a testator devised to his
daughter and to her legal heirs for ever certain real estate, with
the express condition that she should "not alien or dispose of the
same, or join with her husband in any deed for the conveyance
thereof during her natural life." The court held the condition
void, and that a fee-simple estate was devised, and say: " It makes
no difference that the testator has expressly withheld one of the
rights essential to a fee-simple; for the law does not allow an
estate to be granted to a man and his heirs with a restraint on alienation, and frustrates the most clear intention to impose such a
restraint; just as it allowed alienation of an estate tail, though
a contrary intent is manifest. And it would be exceedingly improper, in any court, in construing a devise to a man and his heirs, to
give effect to the restraint upon the alienation by changing the
character of the estate to a life-estate, with a remainder annexed
to it, or with an executory devise over." In Hall v. Tufts, 18
Pick. 455, testator devised certain real estate "to his wife for her
life, and the remainder of the estate, whether real or personal, in
possession or reversion, to his five children, to be equally divided
among them or their heirs, respectively; always intending and
meaning that none of his children shall dispose of their part of
the real estate in reversion before it is legally assigned to them."
It was held that the children took a vested remainder in the-real
estate given to the wife for her life, and that the clause restraining
them from aliening the same before the expiration of the life-estate
was void.
The case of Blackstone Bank v. Davis, 21 Pick. 42, is exactly
in point. In that case one Davis devised to his son the use of a
farm of one hundred and twenty acres, with a provision that the
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land should not be subject or liable to conveyance or attachment.
The plaintiffs recovered a judgment against the devisee, and
levied an execution upon the premises as upon land held by the
defendant in fee. The court say: "By the devise of the profits,
use or occupation of the land, the land itself is devised. Whether
the defendant took an estate in fee or for life only is a question not
material in the present case. The sole question is wliether the
estate in his hands was liable to attachment, and to be taken in
execution as his property. The plaintiffs claim title under the levy
of an execution against the defendant, and their title is valid if
the estate was liable to be so taken. That it was so liable, notwithstanding the proviso or condition in the will, the court cannot
entertain a doubt."
The appellant cites and relies solely upon Nichols v. Eaton, 91
U. S. 716. In that case the testator devised her real estate to
trustees upon trusts to pay the rents, profits and interest to her
four children, with a proviso that if any of her sons should alienate or dispose of the income, or if by means of bankruptcy or
insolvency, or any other means, said income could not be personally enjoyed by them respectively, but would become vested in or
payable to some other person, then the trust in said will concerning
so much thereof as would so vest, should immediately cease and
determine. The case differs from the present one in two essential
and controlling particulars. -First,the estate was devised to trustees, and never vested in the beneficiaries; second, the enjoyment
of the benefits of the devise was made to depend upon a condition.
We have no hesitancy in holding, in view of the authorities
above quoted, and others that might be referred to, that the cofiditions in this deed against alienage and liability for debts are void.
It is insisted, however, that whatever view may be taken of the
foregoing question, still the demurrer should have been overruled,
because the petition alleges that a part of the land was the homestead of the plaintiff and his family, and the execution and return,
notice of sale, and sheriff's certificate, all show that no part of the
land was set apart to plaintiff as a homestead, as by statute required,
but that the whole one hundred and thirty acres were sold in a
lump and bought by the defendant. It is insisted this renders the
sale absolutely void under Linscott v. Lamart, 46 Iowa 312, and
White v. 1?oul4, Id. 680. The petition, we think, does not base
the plaintiff's right to relief upon the ground that a portion of the
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premises was his homestead, and not set apart to him as prescribed
in the statute. The petition does not allege that a portion of the
land is plaintiff's homestead, but incidentally it is alleged that he
has gone into possession of the whole real estate, and occupied the
same, which embraced one hundred and thirty acres as his homestead.
It is not alleged when he took possession, nor does it appear
when the debt was contracted. For aught that the petition shows,
the homestead was liable for this debt. No complaint was made in
the petition that it was not set-off to the plaintiff; nor that the
other property was not first exhausted. The ground upon which
relief is asked, is that the plaintiff owned no interest in the land
subject to execution. The demurrer was properly sustained.
Inasmuch as the defendant offered to release from the operation
of the sheriff's sale the homestead of the plaintiffs, they may, if
they are so advised, have a decree granting them that relief.
The doctrine of the particular case
opens one of the most interesting chapters in the history of the law of real property; for it announces the rule to be,
that a condition annexed to a conveyance of the fee, or to a devise of the
same, which seeks to prohibit the
grantee or devisee from alienating the
property, is unlawful and void, whereas
the old rule was, that a grantee, even
without an express restriction in the
grant, did not possess the* power of
alienation.
Notwithstanding the fact that writers
upon natural law have always maintained that the power of alienation was
one founded on natural right (Grotius,
do Jure Belli et Pacis, lib. 2, c. 6, n. 1),
it nevertheless was a power which was
not allowed to be exercised under the
feudal law of England, for reasons
which it may not be uninteresting to
recall. The feudal system was based
upon the military policy which led the
conquering general to allot to the superior officers or lords large districts or
parcels of the newly-acquired territory.
These allotments were called feuds, and
were held upon condition that the possessor should faithfully defend him by
VOL. XXIX.-24

whom they were given. The lords then
granted smaller districts to their inferiors or vassals, who held the land upon
the similar condition of doing faithful
service to their grantors. But these
grantees could not alienate the feud
without the consent o the lord of the
feud, "lest thereby a feeble or suspicious tenant might have been substituted
and imposed upon him to perform the
feudal services, instead of one nn whose
abilities and fidelity he could depend :"
2 B1. Com. 287. Upon the death of the
grantee, the law originally wa that the
heir of the grantee could not inherit, but
the land at once reverted to the grantor :
2 BI. Com. 56. But afterwards, when
the heirs of the grantee were permitted
to inherit the feud, the law was that if
the blood of the grantee became extinct,
the feud reverted back to the lord of the
fee by whom it was granted: 2 Bl. Com.
245. So that there always remained in
the grantor a possibility of a reveter.
This possibility of reverter was such an
interest in the land as entitled the
grantor to restrict the right of alienation, for if the grantee was left at lib
erty to aliene the premises, it was possible for him, by so doing, to defeat or
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cut off the reversion. We, therefore,
find the rule early laid down as follows:
"A man, before the statute of qula emptores, might have made feoffmeut in fee,
and added further, that if he or his
heirs did alien without license, that he
should pay a fine, then this had been
good ; and so it is said that then the lord
might have restrained the alienation of
his tenant by condition, because the lord
had a possibility of reverter:" C~o. Litt.
223 a, b. And in Mandlebaum v. McDonell, 29 Mich. 78, 94, 95, we find the
court declaring that "at common law,
prior to the statute quia emptores, a condition against alienation would, in England, have been good because prior to
that statute thefeoffor or grantor of such
an estate was entitled to the escheat, on
failure of heirs of grantee, which was
properly a possibility of reverter, and
was treated as a reversion ; so that the
vendor did not, by the feoffiment or conveyance, part with the entire estate; but
this reversion, dependent on this contingency, remained in him and his heirs,
which gave them an interest to insist
upon the condition and take the benefit
accruing to them upon the breach."
But the statute quia emptores changed
all this by cutting off the possibility of a
reverter. The statute quia esmptores, A.
D. 1290, or statute of Westminster, 18
Edw. I., ch. 1, is entitled in the Parliament roll, from the subject of it, statutum
regis de terris vendendis et emendis. This
statute provides, "that from henceforth
it shall be lawful for any freeman to sell
at his own pleasure, his lands and tenemeats, or part of them, so that the feoffee
shall hold the same lands and tenements
of the chief lord of the same fee by such
service and customs as the fcoffor held
before." This statute established the
free right of alienation by the sub-vassal
without the lord's consent, and by declaring that the grantee should not hold
the land of his immediate feoffor, but of
the chief lord of the fee, of whom the
grantor himself held, it in effect cut off

the possibility of reverter, whics the tm
mediate feoffor had hitherto enjoyed, tou
which now passed from him to the chief
lord of the fee. From that time on, the
grantor of the entire estate or fee had no
possible interest in the fee conveyed,
and therefore he was no longer per
mitted to prohibit the right of alienation
for as it has been declared in De Pe.
ster v. M ichael, 6 N. Y. 467, 499, this
possibility of reverter " was the sole
foundation on which rested the right of a
grantor in fee to restrain the alienation."
This "sole foundation," then, being
removed by this statute, the right -which
was based on this foundation consequently fell when it was removed. The
learned editor of Smith's Leading Cases,
however, combats the idea that the reason why the grantor is no longer entitled to impose such a restraint upon his
grantee, is simply because he no longer
has a reversionary interest in the estate
granted. This view of the subject
strikes him as too narrow. "If the
want of a reversionary interest in the
grantor," he says, "and the consequent
absence of tenure between him and the
grantee, were the only reasons why a
condition in restraint of alienation cannot be attached to an estate in fee, there
would be no obstacle to the annexation
of such a proviso to a gift in tail, which
is well known to leave a reversion in the
donor; and yet nothing is better settled
than that a provision restraining or fettering the alienation of an estate-tail, is
essentially void, and a limitation over in
the event of its breach wholly inoperative: King v. Burchell, Ambler 379.
The true reason why such conditions
cannot be attached to estates of inheritance, seems to be that the restrictions
which they impose are necessarily more
injurious on one side than beneficial on
the other, and are inconsistent with the
full property and dominion which the
owners of the soil ought to possess, not
only for their own benefit, but for that
of the community." See note to Dum-
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per't Case, 1 Sm. Ld. Cas. 101. But
the reason which is usually assigned for
this change in the law, is that stated in
the New York case cited above. The
MIichigan case of M1andlebana v. 3lcDonell, cited supra, and which, with the
New York case, are perhaps the two
most satisfactory cases upon this subject,
-which have been decided in this country,
is governed by the same theory that prevailed in the case from New York.
It may be, however, safely affirmed
that it is now settled beyond hope of controversy that since the statute quia enpfores, any condition in a conveyance or
devise of land in fee-simple, which prohibits all alienation of the land by the
grantee, is absolutely void and of no
effect: Co. Litt. 223 a; I Preston on
Etates 477 ; Bradley v. Pixoto, 3 Ves.
Jr. 324; Brandon v. Robinson, 18 Id.
429: .:¥wton
v. Reid, 4 Sim. 141 ; Dick
v. Pitc4Thrd, 1 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 480;
S,ehermerhorn v. Negus, I Denio 448;
Dc J'e.'ster v. .3ichael, 6 1New York
467; Gleason v. Fayerweather, 4 Gray
348; 1all v. Tqfts, IS Pick. 455;
Blac'stone Bank v. Davis, 21 Id. 42;
ReiTnyder v. Hunter, 19 Penn. St. 41;
lT'alker v. Vincent, Id. .169 ; Brothers v.
XcCurdy, 36 Id. 407. See also Oxley
v. Lane, 35 N. Y. 340, 346 ; Van Rensselaer v. Dennison, Id. 393.
But while an entire prohibition of the
right to alienate the estate is thus held
to be void, yet it seems that the grantor
can lawfully prohibit his grantee from
alienating to a particular person. See
I Preoton on Estates 478; Litt., sect.
361 ; Co. Litt. 223. Littlcton says:
"If the condition be such that the
fcoftee shall not alien to such a one,
nuning his name, or to any of his heirs,
or of the issues of such a one or the like,
which conditions do not take away all
power of alienation from the feoffee, &c.,
then such condition is good." In Doe
v. Pearson, 6 East 173, a condition
against alienation, except to the sisters
of the devisees or their children, an-

nexed to a devis, in fee, was held to be
valid, and that the heirs of the devisor
might recover on its breach. But where
a testator, after devising land in equal
shares to several children for life, with
remainder in fee to their children, declared that no portion of the real estate
devised should be sold or alienated by
the devisees or their descendants, except
to each other or to their descendants, the
prohibition against alienation was held
in New York to be void: Schermerhorn
v. Negus, I Denio 448.
We usually find it laid down that
where the prohibition against alienation
is for a limited time only, the limitation
is good, provided only it is for a reasonable time. See Shep. Touch. 129, note
(Am. ed. of 1808) ; Preston on Estates
478; Bae. Abr., Condition, L, note;
Stewart v. Brady, 3 Bush (Ky.) 623;
Stewart v. Barrow, 7 Id. 368. The following have also been supposed to favor
that doctrine : Larges's Case, 2 Leonard
82; s. c. 3 Id. 182 ; Dougal v. P'rger,
3 Mo. 40 ; 31cWiflliams v. N~isly, 2 S. &
It. 507 ; Jackson v. Schutz, 18 Johns.
174, 184; Gray v. Blanchard, 8 Pick.
284; Blackstone Bank v. Davis, 21 Id.
42; Sinonds v. Simonds, 3 Mete. 562;
Langdon v. Ingram's Guardian, 28 Ind.
360. And Mr. Washburn asserts the
same principle: I Wash. on Real Prop.
69. And it is safe to say that this has
been generally supposed to be the true
doctrine. It is in view of this impre,sion being so general, as well as from
the importance of the question itself, that
the case of M3andlebaum v. AlcDondl, 29
Mich. 78, cited in the particular case, is
worthy of most attentive consideration ;
for the question directly arose in that
case, and it was expressly ruled that a
prohibition of alienation, even for a
limited period, was void.
The authorities were all considered,
and in the opinion of the court, the contrary theory was based upon a misconception of Large's Case, supra. The
opinion is able and exhaustive, and com
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lug as it does from a court whose ability
is everywhere conceded, it will not be
surprising if it finally comes to be regarded as a correct exposition of the law
upon this subject, notwithstanding that
the contrary view was so generally regarded as right. The contrary impression of the law was all but universal.
Even in a recent case in the Supreme
Court of the United States, we find Mr.
Justice FisLD asserting that "conditions which prohibit its alienation to particular persons orfor a limited period, or
its subjection to particular uses, are not
subversive of the estate ; they do not
destroy or limit its alienable or inheritable character :" Cowell v. Springs Co.,
100 U. S. 55. What was here said as
to a prohibition of alienation for a limited period, was, however, a mere obiter
dictum, as the real question before the
court was simply whether a restriction to
particular uses was valid. The prohibition in this case was against using the
property for the sale of intoxicating
liquors, and it was sustained as valid.
The Supreme Court of Connecticut had
held in an earlier case that a condition
in a deed that no ardent spirits shduld
be kept or sold on any part of the premises, was valid: Collins v. Marcy, 25
Conn. 242. There are many other cases
to the same effect.
Not only is a condition restraining the
grantee from alienating the premises
void, but it is also held that a condition
which requires the grantee or devisee to
pay to the grantor or devisor a sum of
money upon alienation, is invalid. See
King v. Burchell, Arab. 379 ; Livingston
v. &ilddes, 7 Hill 257 ; De Peyster v.
M chlzal, 6 N. Y. 467, 494. In this last
cited case the court say that "If the continuance of the estate can be made to depend on the payment of a tenth, or a
sixth, or a fourth part of the value of
the land at every sale, it may be made
to depend on the payment of nine-tenths
or the whole of the sale money. It is
imponsible on any known principle to

say, that a condition to pay a quarter of
the sale money is valid, and a condi
tion to pay the half or any quarter proportion would be void. If we affirm the
validity of a condition to pay a quarter,
we must affirm a conditiorn to pay any
quarter amount. It would be a bold
assertion to say that the adoption of such
a principle would not operate as a fatal
restraint upon alienation. That which
cannot be done by a direct prohibition
cannot be done indirectly. The enforcement of the restraint upon alienation by
requiring money to be paid for the privilege, and by a forfeiture in case of nonpayment, separates the incident of free
alienation from the estate in fee as effectually as a direct prohibition."
It is held, however, that an annual
rent may be reserved upon conveyance
in fee, with a right of re-entry for nonpayment; and in Pennsylvania, such
rents, under the name of ground-rents,
are very numerous and have given rise
to one of the most learned and important branches of the law of real property.
See Ingersoll v. Sergeant, I Whart. 337 ;
Franciscus v. Beigart, 4 Watts 98; Irwin v. Bank of U. S., 1 Barr 349, and
Robb v. Beaver, 8 W. & S. 126. Groundrents also exist in New York: Van Rensselaer v. Ball, 19 N. Y. 100. And it
is immaterial that there is no reversion
in the person entitled to the rent : Van
Rensselaer v. Hays, 19 N. Y. 68. Such
rents are real estate : Cobb v. Biddle, 2
Harris 444; and pass under a devise of
all the testator's tenements and hereditaments: Van Rensselaer v. Read, 26 N.
Y. 558.
Before leaving this subject, it is worthy
of remark that in the case of a grant by
the sovereign, it is lawful for him to impose upon the grantee a prohibition of
his right to alienate the estate. The
reason being "because he may reserve a
tenure to himself:" Co. Litt. 223, a, b.
This discredits, too, the opinion expressed by the editor of Smith's Lead.
Cas., and which we adverted to above.
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In so far as the question involved in
the principal case related to tle power of
the grantor to impose a prohihition of the
right of alienation, it seems that there
was no diliculty in the case. The grantor
had conveyed a fee-simple estate, retaining no interest therein for himself. There
was no possibiliti of a reverter even.
There is no authority therefore for holding that such a restriction upon the right
of voluntary alienation could be sustained. Nevertheless, the court has devoted the major part of its opinion to
the consideration of this question, passing by in a few words what really seems
to have been the important feature of the
case. That was whether the provision
that the land could not be sold for the
debts of the grantee, was valid. In other
words is a provision against the involunland for the debts
tary alienation of tile
of the grantor, to be sustained as distinguished from a provision against the
It
voluntary alienation of the land.
must be confessed, we think, that the
court does not deal with this branch of
the case as fully as was desirable, espedally as it involved the very pith and
marrow of the question raised.
In 3randon v. Robinson, 18 Ves. 429,
Lord ELDO held in a case where a
a trust had been created to pay the dividends from time to time into the hands
of the cestui que trust, with a proviso that
the dividends should not be "grantable,
transferable, or otherwise assignable,"
that notwithstanding the proviso, the
dividends passed upon the bankruptcy of
the cestui que trust to his assignee. The
weight of authority in this country, is,
however, evidently in favor of the proposition that an estate may be limited
in trust for a debtor, so that it shall be
free from involuntary alienation at the
suit of his creditors, whether the instrument do or do not contain a limitation
over upon such event : Ysher v. Taylor, 2
lawle 33; Ashhurst v. Given, 5 W. & S.
323; Vaux v. Parke, 7 Id. 19; Norris
v. Johnston, 5 Barr 289 ; Eyria v.

I[letrick, I Harris 491 ; Barnett'sAppeal,
10 Wright 399, 402; Leavitt v. Beirne,
21 Conn. 8 ; Markham v. Guerrant, 4
Leigh 279 ; Johnston v. Zane's Trustees,
11 Gratt. 552; Pope v. Elliott, 8 B.
Mlonr. 56; Frazier v. Barnum, 4 C. E.
Green 316; ll v..M1cRae, 27 Ala. 175.
See Wms. Law Real Prop. (Am. ed. of
1872) p. 91, where the cases are all collected.
The opinion pronounced in the particular case, says "The appellant cites
and relies solely upon NLichols v. Eaton, 91
U. S.716," and seeks to dispose of that
case by saying, that in it the testator had
devised the estate to trustees, whereas in
the case under consideration the grant
was direct. But we are much mistaken
if the distinction which the Iowa court
draws between the two cases, disposes of
the question which the appellants had
raised. For the reasoning of the Supreme
Court of the United States in that case,
seems, so far as we are able to judge,
as applicable to a direct grant with a
restriction against involuntary alienation as it is to one made to a trustee.
The language of the Supreme Court
of the United States in that case was
as follows: "We do not wish to have
it understood that we accept the limitations which that (English Chancery)
court has placed upon the power of
testamentary disposition of property by
its owner. We do not see, as implied
in the remark of Lord ELDOx, that the
power of alienation is a necessary incident to a life-estate in real property, or
that the rents and profits of real property, and the interest and dividends of
personal property may not be enjoyed
by an individual without liability for his
debts being attached as a necessary incident to such enjoyment. This doctrine
is one which the English Chancery Court
has engrafted upon the common law for
the benefit of creditors, and is comparatively of modem origin. * * * The doctrine, that the owner of property, in the
free exercise of his will in disposing of it,
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cannot so dispose of it, but that the
object of his bounty, who parts with
nothing in return, must hold it subject to
the debts due his creditors, though that
may soon deprive him of all the benefits
sought to be conferred by the testator's
affection or generosity, is one which we
are not prepared to announce as the doctrine of this court."
The court then
denies that creditors have any right to
complain because they are denied access
to property devised or granted under
such conditions. The grant or devise
is matter of record, and creditors cannot be deceived or misled, as the conditions under which the property is held,

being matter of record, inform them that
they ninu-r not trust to the property so
held. What right then have creditors
to complain ? If they have no right to
complain, who is there to complain ? If
no one can complain, and if it is not, as
the Supreme Court of the United States
affirms, a necessary incident of property
that it should be subject to involuntary
a t ienation, what reason is there which
makes it necessary that the property
should be granted in trust in order to
protect it from involuntary alienation ?
Upon principle we cannot see why any
distinction should be made between the
two cases.
HENRY WADE ROGERS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
UNION INSTITUTION FOR SAVINGS v.

CITY OF BOSTON

ET AL.

On a aebt which by express contract is payable at a specified future time, and
until then is to bear a certain rate of interest, the same rate is to be allowed after
maturity and uutil payment of the principal, whether it be called an incident or part
of the debt, or damages for non-payment.
The cases on this subject carefully examined.
THIS was a bill in equity by a mortgagee of land taken by the
city for the public use, to enforce a lien upon the money due from
the city for damages for such taking, By the terms of the mortgages, the amounts of the mortgage debts were to be paid in five
years, which had elapsed some time before the filing of the bill,
"with interest semi-annually, at the rate of seven and a half per
centum per annum ;" and the question raised was, at what rate the
interest should be computed for the time since the principal sums
became due.
By the stat. of 1867, c. 56, sect. 1, the legal rate of interest in

Massachusetts is six per cent. a year, when there is no agreement
for a different rate; and by sect. 2, it is lawful to contract for any
rate of interest, "provided, however, that no greater rate of
interest than six per centum per annum shall be recovered in any
action, except when the agreement to pay such greater rate of

interest is in writing."
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
GRAY, 0. J.-When a written agreement is made, as authorized
by the statute, to pay a greater rate of interest yearly than six per
cent., the intention of the contract and the effect of the statute
appear to us to be that the creditor shall receive the stipulated rate
of interest so long as the debtor has the use of the principal; and
that, in an action upon the contract, the creditor shall recover
interest at that rate, not merely until the time when the principal
is agreed to be paid to him, but until it is actually paid, or his
claim for principal and interest judicially established.
In Brannon v. Hursell, 112 Mass. 63, it was accordingly held,
in an action upon a promissory note payable in four months "with
interest at ten per cent.," that interest was to be computed at that
rate, not merely to the maturity of the note, but to the time of
the verdict; and upon reconsideration of the authorities there
referred to, and examination of the numerous decisions cited at the
argument of the present case, we see no reason to overrule or
qualify the point adjudged, although the statement in the opinion
that "the plaintiff recovers interest, both before and after the note
matures, by virtue of the contract, as an incident or part of the
debt." might well be modified so as to say that the interest after
the breach of the contract, though not strictly xecoverable as part
of the debt, but rather as damages, is ordinarily to be measured,
according to the intention manifested by the contract, by the
standard thereby established.
In Price v. Great Western Railway, 16 M. & W. 244, 248,
Baron PARKE said that the reason why, under a mortgage deed
whereby interest is payable up to a certain day, interest beyond
that day might be recovered as damages, was "because the deed
shows the intention of the parties that it should be a debt bearing
interest ;" and added, "The jury give it as damages for the detention of the debt. It is not recoverable as interest on the contract
itself."
In Horgan v. Jones, 8 Exch. 620, the owners of a vessel mortgaged it as security for a debt, with a proviso for a redemption on
payment of the principal and interest at the rate of ten per cent.
in six months, but without any provision for payment of interest
after that time. The principal not being paid then, it was held
by Chief Baron POLLOCK and Barons PARKE, PLATT and MARTIN
that the mortgagee was entitled to interest at the same rate until
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payment; and Baron PARKE said: "It was a sale of a chattel,.
redeemable on a certain day; then, if the mortgagors do not avail
themselves of that provision, th- -ame rate of interest continues
payable. It is exactly like a mortgage of real estate, where the
mortgagee becomes the legal owner."
So in Keene v. Keene, 3 C. B. (N. S.) 144, an action by an
indorsee against the drawer of a bill of exchange for 2001., pay-able in twelve months, with interest at the rate of ten per cent.
per annum, was referred to a master, who allowed ten per cent.
interest after, as well as before, the maturity of the bill. The
defendant moved to recommit the case to the master; and argued
that there was no implied contract on the part of the drawer, upon
the acceptor's default, to pay more than the ordinary interest of
five per cent.; that the acceptor could only be liable to interest at
five per cent. after maturity of the bill; and that the bill was in
effect a bill for 2201. But the court overruled the motion. Mr.
Justice WILLES said: "Until the maturity of the bill, the interest
is a debt; after its maturity, the interest is given as damages at
the discretion of the jury. Here a jury might adopt as the measure of damages the rate of interest which the parties themselves
had fixed; and the master is substituted for a jury." Chief Justice CocKEBURN said: "I see no ground for referring this case
back to the master, as prayed. He has, as he well might, given
in the shape of damages the rate of interest the parties themselves
had contracted for. I think he has done quite right." Mr. Justice
CROWDER said: "I. am of the same opinion. The master "would,
I think, have acted very unreasonably if he had not assessed the
damages by the rate which the parties had stipulated as to the value
of the money." And Mr. Justice WILLIAMS concurred.
In Cook v. Fowler, L. R., 7 H. L. 28, a debtor, on May 2d 1864,
gave a warrant of attorney to a creditor "to secure the payment
of the sum of 18301., with interest thereon at and after the rate
of 51. per cent. per month, on the 2d of June next, judgment to
be entered up forthwith; and in case of default in payment of the
said sum of 13301. and interest thereon, on the day aforesaid, execution or executions and other processes may then issue for the
said sum of 13301. with interest, together with costs of entering
up judgment, &c., &c., and all other incidental expenses whatever."
The debtor died before -the second of June, and no judgment was
entered up. The creditor, who also held mortgages on lands of his
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debtor, concealed his warrant of attorney for three years, and then
set it up in answer to a bill of the executors against him for an
account, and more than a year later first claimed to be allowed
interest for the whole time at the rate of sixty per cent. a year.
It was held by the House of Lords, affirming a decree of Vice
Chancellor STUART, that he was entitled after the 2d of June 1864,
to ordinary interest only; and this upon two grounds: 1st. That
the warrant of attorney and the defeasance did not create a contract, but only an authority to enter up judgment on June 2d
1864, and a stipulation that execution might then issue. 2d. The
extraordinary and excessive rate of interest, and the conduct of
the creditor.
Although Lord CIIELMSFORD (apparently overlooking the cases
of 3Morgan v. Jones and Keene v. Keene, above cited) said, "There
is no authority that I can find to support the argument of the
counsel for the appellant, that when a security for money payable
at a certain day stipulates for the allowance of a certain rate of
interest up to the day fixed for payment, interest at the same rate
is implied to be payable afterwards :" L. R., 7 H. L. 35; Lord
Chancellor CAIRNS and Lord SELBORNE were clearly of a different
opinion. The Lord Chancellor said that, according to the wellknown principle, which had been referred to in many cases, "any
claim, in the nature of a claim for interest after the day up to
which interest was stipulated for, would be a claim really, not for a
stipulated sum and interest, but for damages, and then it would be
for the tribunal before which that claim was asserted to consider the
position of the claimant, and the sum which properly, and under
all the circumstances, should be awarded for damages. No doubt,
primdfacie, the rate of interest stipulated for up to the time certain, might be taken, and generally would be taken, as the measure
of interest; but that would not be conclusive. It would be for
the tribunal to look at all the circumstances of the case, 'and to
decide what was the proper sum to be awarded by way of damages:"
pp. 32, 33. And Lord SELBORNE said: "Although in cases of
this class interest for the delay of payment post diem ought to be
given, it is on the principle, not of implied contract, but of damages
for a breach of contract. The rate of interest to which the parties
have agreed during the term of their contract may well be adopted
in an ordinary case of this kind by a court or jury, as a proper
measure of damages for the subsequent delay; but that is because,
VOL. XXIX.25
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ordinarily, a reasonable and usual rate of interest, which it may be
presumed would have been the same whatever might be the duration of the loan, has been agreed to :" pp. 37, 38.
In a later case, Lord Justice AmPHLETT considered it to be
clearly established by the previous decisions, that in the case of a
mercantile security it is to be supposed that the parties intended
interest to run on at the old rate, if the money was not paid at the
date; and so, in the redemption of mortgages, although the day
for payment has passed and there is no provision with the creditor
for payment of interest after that day, the court will assume that
interest is payable after the day at the same rate as before, and
that, although what has to be paid may technically be called damages, they are damages of a peculiar kind, for it would not be left
to a jury to regulate the amount; but the jury would be directed,
as a matter of law, to find damages of the same amount as the
interest, which would have been payable, if the promise had
extended over the period: Gordillo v. Weguelin, 5 Ch. D. 287,
303.
In the very recent case of In re Roberts, 14 Ch. D. 49, where
by a mortgage deed, reciting an agreement for a loan of 50001., at
the rate of ten per cent. per annum, the mortgagor covenanted to
pay in six months the sum of 2501., being half a year's interest on
the 50001., and in twelve months the sum of 2501., being a further
half year's interest, and also the principal sum of 50001., making
together 52501., and made no covenant for the payment of interest
in the event of the principal remaining unpaid after the day named
for its repayment, but actuqlly paid interest at the rate of ten per
cent. for three years afterwards, and then died; and after a decree
for administration of his estate, the mortgagee proved as a creditor
for principal and interest; it was indeed held by Sir.GEORGE JESSEL,
M. R., and Lords Justices BRETT and COTTON, that he was entitled in such a suit to the interest at the rate of five per cent. only.
But no decision upon the point appears to have been brought to
the notice of the court, except Cook v. Fowler, above cited; and
the case was decided upon the assumption that there was no precedent for giving more than the ordinary rate of interest by way of
damages. Under such circumstances, the case cannot be considered, by a court not bound by it as authority, to outweigh the
decisions of Chief Baron POLLOCK and Baron PARKE, of Chief Justice COCKBURN and Mr. Justice WILLES, and their associates, and
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the opinions of Lord CAIRNS and Lord SELBORNE, above quoted.
It may also be observed that the Master of the Rolls said (without
giving any reason why the agreement of the parties should be
aliowed a greater effect by way of protection of the party who had
broken his contract, than for the benefit of the party who by such
breach had been deprived of the use of his money) that if the rate
of interest named by the parties were below the ordinary rate, it
would be the proper measure of damages; and that Lord Justice
COTTON took the precaution to remark that the court was not
deciding what rate of interest should be allowed in a suit for
redemption.
Before the decision in Brannon v. Hursell, the rule there
declared had been established in Indiana, California, Texas, New
Jersey, Illinois, Wisconsin, Iowa, Nevada and Tennessee: Kilgore
v. Powers, 5 Blackf. 22; Kohler v. Smith, 2 Cal. 597; Guy v.
Franklin, 5 Id. 416; Corcoran v. Doll, 32 Id. 82; Hopkins v.
Crittenden, 10 Texas 189; Wilson v. Marsh, 2 Beasley 289;
Phinney v. Baldwin, 16 Ill. 108; Etnyre v. MeDaniel, 28 Id.
201; Heartt v. Rhodes, 66 Id. 351; Spencer v. Mfaxfield, 16
Wis. 541; Pruyn v. Milwaukee, 18 Id. 367; Hand v. Armstrong,
18 Iowa 324; Thompson v. Pickel, 20 Id. 490; McLane v. Abrams,
2 Nev. 199; Overton v. Bolton, 9 Heisk. 762. It has since been
affirmed by decisions of the highest courts of Ohio, Michigan and
Virginia: Monnett v. Sturges, 25 Ohio St. 384; Marietta Iron
Works v. Lottimer, Id. 621; Warner v. Tuif 38 Mich. 662;
Cecil v. Hicks, 29 Gratt. 1. And it has been acted on by Judge
LOWELL in the Circuit Court of the United States for this district:
Burgess v. Southbridge Savings Bank, 2 Fed. Rep. 500.
In Connecticut, the law seems formerly to have been considered
as settled in accordance with these decisions, and although some
recent dicta have a tendency to explain away the grounds assigned
in the earlier judgments, there is no adjudication to the contrary:
Beckwith v. Hartford, Providence " Pishkill Railroad Co., 29
Conn. 268; Adams v. Way, 33 Id. 419; Hubbard v. Callahan,
42 Id. 524, 537; Suffield Ecclesiastical Society v. Loomis, Id.
570, 575; Seymour v. Continental Ins. Co., 44 Id. 300.
The earlier decisions in New York support the same rule, both
as to mortgages and as to ordinary debts: Miller v. Burroughs, 4
Johns. Ch. 436; F-an Beuren v. Van Gaasbeck, 4 Cowen 496.
But in the light of later cases, the question may perhaps be con-
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sidered an open one in that state. See Bell v. Mayor of .New
York, 10 Paige 49; Hamilton v. Van Bersselaer, 43 N. Y. 244;
Bitter v. Phillips, 53 Id. 586. It may be doubted, however,
whether the cases of Macomber v. Dunham, 8 Wend. 550, and
United States Bank v. Ohapin, 9 Id. 471, sometimes referred to
in discussions of the subject, are really applicable. In one of them
the decision was that a corporation, authorized by its charter to
charge interest for a full month on loans for more than fifteen days
and less than a month, could not demand interest at the same rate
during subsequent months while such a loan remained unpaid. In
the other, the only point decided was, that a bank, limited by statute to six per cent. interest on all discounts, was not thereby prevented from recovering the legal rate of seven per cent. as damages
after breach of the contract by the other party. Each case turned,
not upon the terms of a contract, but upon the effect of a peculiar
statute, the scope of which was clearly defined and limited. And
in neither of them is there any intimation of an intention to overrule the decision of Chancellor KENT in Miller v. Burroughs, or

that of Chief Justice SAVAGE and Justices SUTHERLAND and
case ofJ
WOODWORTE in Van Beuren v. Van aaasbeck. The
Kitahen v. Mobile Bank, 14 Ala. 233, is like United States Bank
v. Chapin.
In Ashuelot :Railroad Co. v. -Elliott,57 N. H. 397, 437, 439,
cited for the defendant Farnsworth, the point decided was, that
upon bonds bearing interest at the rate of six per cent. annually,
payable half-yearly, interest after maturity, and payment of all the
coupons, should be computed in equity at the rate of six per cent.,
without annual or other rests; in short, that compound interest
should not be allowed in a suit on the principal debt. That decision, in effect overruling Peirce v. Bowe, 1 N. H. 179, accords
with the general current of authority, in equity as well as at law:
Ferry v. Ferry, 2 Cush. 92; Connecticut v. Jackson, 1 Johns.
Ch. 13; Van Benschooten v. Lawson, 6 Id. 313; Mowry v. Bishop,
v.
5 Paige 98 ; Sparks v. Garrigues,1 Binn. 152, 165 ; Stokely
48;
Thompson, 34 Penn. St. 210; Doe v. Warren, 7 Greenlf.
affect the
Parkchurst v. Cummings, 56 Maine 155. It does not

question before us.

The leading cases in support of the defendant's view are Lud22
wick v. Huntzinger, 5 W. & S. 51, and Brewster v. Wakefield,
How. 118.

UNION INST. FOR SAVINGS v. BOSTON.

197

In Ludwick v. Huntziger, it was held by the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, that on a bond for the payment of money in
twenty-one months, with three per cent. interest from date, the
obligee was entitled to recover three per cent. interest until the
time fixed for payment, and six per cent. afterwards.
In Brewster v. Jlakefield,.it was held by the Supreme Court of
the United States (reversing the judgment of the Supreme Court
of the territory of Minnesota in 1 Minn. 352), that upon a mortgage to secure notes which respectively stipulated for the payment
of interest at the yearly rates of twenty-four and twenty-five per
cent., where the rate fixed by statute, in the absence of express
agreement, was seven per cent., interest at the rate of seven per
cent. only, could be recovered after the maturity of the notes.
Chief Justice TA.,BY, in delivering judgment, said: "The contract
being entirely silent as to interest, if the notes should not be punctually paid, the creditor is entitled to interest after that time by
operation of law, and not by any provision in the contract. And,
in this view of the subject, we think the territorial courts committed an error in allowing, after the notes fell due, a higher rate
of interest than that established by law where there was no contract to regulate it." He then referred to the cases of Mfacomber
v. Dunham, United States Bank v. Chapin, and Ludwiok v. Huntzinger, above stated, and added: "Nor is there anything in the
character of this contract that should induce the court, by supposed intendment of the parties or doubtful inferences, to extend
the stipulation for interest beyond the time specified in the written
contract. The law of Minnesota has fixed seven per cent. per
annum as a reasonable and fair compensation for the use of money;
and where a party desires to exact, from the necessities of a borrower, more than three times as much as the legislature deems
reasonable and just, he must take care that the contract is so written, in plain and unambiguous terms, for, with such a claim, he
must stand upon his bond."
The same rule appears to have been followed by the Supreme
Court in a case from the territory of Utah: Burnhisel v. Jirman,
22 Wall. 170. And it has since been adopted as a general rule
by the courts of Kansas, Minnesota, South Carolina, Rhode Island,
Kentucky, Arkansas and Maine: Robinson v. Kinney, 2 Kansas
184; Lash v. Lambert, 15 Minn. 416; Moreland v. Lawrence,
23 Id. 84; Langston v. South Garolina Railroad Co., 2 So. C.
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(N. S.) 248; Pearce v. Hennessy, 10 R. I. 223; Billing v. Tomp.
8on, 12 Bush 310; Newton v. Jennerly, 31 Ark. 626; -Duranv.
Aler, 67 Maine 145; Eaton v. Boissonnault, Id. 540.
But the later judgments of the Supreme Court exhibit a difference of opinion as to the general rule, though not of adjudication
in the particular cases before the court.
In Cromwell v. County of Sac, 96 U. S. 51, which arose in the
Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Iowa, upon a
bond given in Iowa, and stipulating for the payment of ten per
cent. interest, Mr. Justice FIELD, delivering the judgment of the
Supreme Court, treated the decision in Brewster v. Wakefield as
based upon the exorbitant rate of the interest, and after referring
to Brannon v. Hursell, and many of the other American cases
above cited, said: "The preponderance of opinion is in favor of
the doctrine that the stipulated rate of interest attends the contract until it is merged in the judgment." And it was held,
reversing in this respect the judgment of the Circuit Court, that
the construction given by the Supreme Court of Iowa to the
statute of that state was conclusive, and that interest must be
computed at the rate expressed in the contract to the time of
judgment.
On the other hand, in the case of Holden v. Trust Co., 100 U.
S. 72, which arose in the District of Columbia, under a statute
like ours, except in not allowing the parties to stipulate for interest
at a greater rate than ten per cent., it was held, upon a bill in
equity, that on a note made payable in four years, with interest at
the rate of ten per cent., payable semi-annually, and secured by a
conveyance of real estate in trust, interest from the maturity of the
note should be computed at the ordinary rate of six per cent. only,
and Mr. Justice SwAYNE, in delivering judgment, said: "The
rule heretofore applied by this court, under the circumstances of
this case, has been to give the contract rate up to the maturity of
the contract, and thereafter the rate prescribed for cases where the
parties themselves have fixed no rate: Brewster v. Wakefield, 22
How. 118; Burnhiselv. Pirman,22 Wall. 170. Where a different
rule has been established, it governs, of course, in that locality.
The question is always one of local law. This subject was fully
examined in the recent case in this court of Cromwell v. County of
Sac, 94 U. S. 351. [The reference intended is evidently 96 U. S.
51, above cited.] We need not go over the ground again. Here
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the agreement of the parties extends no farther than to the time
fixed for the payment of the principal. As to everything beyond
that, it is silent. If payment be not made when the money becomes
due, there is a breach of the contract, and the creditor is entitled
to damages. Where none has been agreed upon, the law fixes the
amount according to the standard applied in all such cases. It is
the legal rate of interest where the parties have agreed upon none.
If the parties meant that the contract rate should continue, it would
have been easy to say so. In the absence of a stipulation, such an
intendment cannot be inferred."
The law upon this subject, as declared by the Supreme Court of
the United States, would appear to be that in the District of Columbia or in a territory of the United States, the rate of interest
agreed by the parties in the usual form is recoverable to the stipulated time of payment only, and the statute rate of interest afterwards, but that cases arising in any state must be governed by the
local law, as expounded by its courts.
Two observations may be made on the judgments which are
opposed to the decision in Brannon v. Hursell. 1st. They admit
that the intent of the parties, if expressed with sufficient clearness
in their contract, will govern the rate of interest to the time of
judgment: Brewster v. Wakefield and Holden v. Trust Co., above
cited; Pearce v. Hennessy, 10 R. I. 227; Capen v. Crowell, 66
Maine 282; Paine v. Caswell, 68 Id. 80; Gray v. Briscoe, 6
Bush 687; Young v. Thompson, 2 Kansas 83. 2d. They assume,
in opposition to the leading English cases, that if interest after the
maturity of the contract is to be recovered, not as interest, but as
damages, it must necessarily be estimated at the ordinary rate.
The question being, as is clearly recognised in the two most
recent judgments of the Supreme Court of the United States, one
of local law, in deciding which this court is not bound by the
opinion of any other tribunal, we are constrained, with great respect
for those who take a different view of the subject, to say that the
rule established in this Commonwealth by the adjudication in
Brannon v. ifursell appears to us to best accord with the purpose
of the legislature, with the apparent intention of the parties, with
the usage and understanding of men of business, with the weight of
legal reasoning and authority, and with the principles of equity
that govern the enforcement and redemption of mortgages.
In the case before us, each of the mortgages to the plaintiff,
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duly recorded, and subject to which the defendant Farnsworth took
his title, makes the payment by the mortgagors of the principal
debt in five years, "with interest semi-annually at the rate of seven
and a half per cent. per annum," a condition upon which the mortgage, and "one note of even date herewith" whereby the mortgagors "promise to pay the said corporation or order the said sum
and interest at the times aforesaid," shall be void. Each of the
notes thus referred to does in the most explicit terms require interest to "be paid semi-annually at the rate of seven and a half per
centum per annum during said term, and for such further time as
said principal sum or any part thereof shall remain unpaid ;" and
the description of the debt and interest in the mortgage might be
held sufficient to give any one taking the land subject to the mortgage such information that he could not redeem the land without
paying interest according to the stipulation in the notes, even if
by that stipulation such interest was to be computed for a longer
period than would appear upon the face of the mortgage taken by
itself: Bichards v. Holmes, 18 How. 143; Ackens v. Winston, 7
C. E. Green 444. But we do not decide that point, because we
are of opinion, on the grounds already stated, that the legal effect
of the provision of the mortgage is the same as that of the fuller
language of the note.
The stipulated rate is only one-fifth of one per cent. per year
higher than the interest payable upon some notes of the United
States, and there is no pretence that it is unconscionable or unreasonable. The claim upon the money received by Farnsworth from
the city is no less than it would have been against the land for
which that money is a substitute: Farnsworth v. Boston, 126
Mass. 1. As he might at any time have stopped the running of the
interest after the maturity of the notes by performing his obligation and paying the mortgage debt, neither the lapse of time nor
the other circumstances of the case afford any reason why the
plaintiff should not recover interest at the stipulated rate to the
time of the decree.
Decree affirmed.

MINERS' TRANS. CO. v. FIREMAN'S INS. CO.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.
MINERS' TRANSPORTATION CO. v. ASSOCIATED FIREMAN'S

INSURANCE CO.
Although there may be damages under a policy of fire insurance, for goods not
actually destroyed, as, e. y.-, for those damaged by water used to extinguish a fire,
yet the damages must be such as are the proximate result of fire, and happen to the
property insured.
The law of general average is not a part of the risk incident to a fire pol-cy, even
though tile policy be on a vessel.
A steamer, insured under a fire policy, took fire and was sunk to save it; the
result was damage to the cargo, which was declared to be subject to general average, and the owners of the steamer had to contribute: Held, that they could not
recover the sum so contributed, from the insurers, under the fire policy.

THIs was an action brought by the appellant, owner of the
steamer "George Appold," on a fire policy, issued by the appellee,
insuring said steamer against loss by fire.
It appeared that on the 20th October 1877, while loading at the
port of Savannah, a fire was discovered among a cargo of cotton,
stored in the forehold of the steamer, and in order to save both the
steamer and cargo from destruction, it was found necessary to submerge the vessel.
The damages direct and indirect to the steamer itself were esti
mated at $2500, and the damages to the cargo at $10,500.
The adjuster to whom the matter was referred, decided that the
damages to the cargo were according to the usage and laws of the
port of Baltimore, subject to the law of general average; and the
appellant, as owner of the steamer, was obliged to contribute to
the cargo the sum of $5231.29.
The steamer was insured by the appellee and other fire companies to the amount of $80,000, and the cargo was insured under
marine policies.
The fire companies tendered themselves ready to pay $2500, the
amount of damage sustained by the steamer; but the appellant
claimed that, in addition to this sum, he was entitled to recover the
amount paid by him under the law of general damage to the cargo.
And this was the sole question at issue.

Charles Marshall and William A. Fisher, for appellant.-The
question is whether fire was the immediate cause of the loss claimed
Actual combustion is not the test. Damage by water is covered
by a fire policy, and such damage is the immediate consequence of
Voi- XXIX.- 26
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fire, when necessarily incurred for the purpose of protecting the
insured subject from destruction by combustion: City Fire Ins.
Co. v. C"rlies, 21 Wend. 367; Welles v. Boston Ins. Co., 6 Pick.
182; Geisek v. Crescent Mut. Ins. Co., 19 La. Ann. 297; Scripture v. Lowell Manf. F. Ins. Co., 10 Cush. 356; Case v. Hartford
.ire. Ins. Co., 13 Ill. 676, 680; Nimick v. Holmes, 25 Penn. St.
866.
The insurers will be held to have contemplated all perils to which
the vessel was exposed by reason of the peril insured against. The
policy is upon a vessel "trading from Baltimore to Boston and
elsewhere, as a general freight steamer, while running, or in port
or harbor." Here is a ship insured, and insured as a freight ship;
insured in port and on a voyage. Should she take fire, and in
putting out the fire water be used, it is not denied that the phlsical
damage done to the corpus of the ship by the water so used must
be borne by the insurer. But one way to extinguish fire in a ship,
and especially in a freight ship, familiar to all who know what
ships are, is to scuttle her and fill her with water. Sometimes this
course is the only course; and by the eighth condition of the
policy, it is made the duty of the insured to do all in his power for
the safety and protection of the property insured. But if she be
scuttled voluntarily, having a cargo on board, she cannot be scuttled without subjecting the cargo to damage, and the damage thus
voluntarily suffered by ship and cargo for the preservation of both,
if successful, gives rise to a liability on the part of each to contribute to pay the loss.
As to whether this loss is the immediate result of peril insured
against: Peters v. Warren Ins. Co., 14 Pet. 99; Gen. Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Sherwood, 14 How. 351; Dent v. Smith, L. R., 4 Q. B.
414; 1 Parsons Mar. Ins. 554, 555 n., where the author questions
the decision of Judge STORY in Peters v. Warren Ins. Co., supra,
an the ground that the loss there allowed, as one within the policy,
was a loss growing out of the particularlocal law applicable to the
collision, and not out of the operation of the general maritime law,
as in this case.
John

. Thomas and George Hankins Williams, for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
ROBINSON, J.-Were this a question to be determined purely
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upon equitable principles, there might be some ground to support
the appellant's contention.
The steamer was fully insured by the fire companies, and in the
event of its destruction by fire, they would have been liable for the
entire loss sustained by the appellant. In that event, instead of
the sum of $5231.29, now claimed by the appellant, they would
have been obliged to pay the entire amount covered by their
respective policies. If the steamer was saved from destruction by
being submerged, and the appellant, as owner, was in consequence
thereof obliged to pay $5000 for damages to the cargo, it would
seem but fair and equitable that he should be reimbursed a loss
thus incurred for the benefit and protection of the insurers.
The liability, however* of the insurer is one arising upon contract, and must be determined by the terms of the policy upon
which this suit is brought. It is hardly necessary to say that a
policy of insurance, like any other contract, must be construed
according to the evident intention of the parties, to be gathered
from the language used, taken in connection with the subjectmatter to which it refers.
The rights and obligations of the parties to this suit must, therefore, be determined by the contract as made between them, and we
have no power to add new conditions or to extend the risk beyond
what is fairly within the terms of the policy itself.
Now what are the terms of this policy ? Looking to the face
of it, we find the thing insured is a steamer, and the peril insured
against is loss by fire. No other risk was assumed by the insurer.
and indemnity against loss from this peril, and this alone, was the
consideration for which the premium was paid by the insured.
Here, then, is a contract in regard to a specific subject, and made
for a specific purpose, and by it the correlative rights and obligations of the parties must be determined. It is not contended that
the appellee has in express terms agreed to reimburse the appellant
for losses which as owner he might be obliged to contribute to the
cargo; but the argument is, that the insurer is liable for all damages resulting directly from the peril insured against, and that
actual combustion is not always the test by which such damages
are to be ascertained. This in a certain sense is true. The
insurer of a stock of goods may be liable for damages caused by
watel, although the water was used to extinguish a fire upon the
house in which such goods were stored. And upon the same prin
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ciple it has been held, that the insurer of a house is liable for its
destruction when such destruction was absolutely necessary to
arrest the progress of a fire in a city : City Fire Ins. Co. v. Corlies, 21 Wend. 367; Witherell v. Maine Ins. Co., 49 Me. 200;
Geisek v. Crescent Hut. Ins. Co., 19 La. Ann. 297; Hillier v.
Allegheny Ins. Co., 8 Penn. St. 470; Thompson v. Montreal Ins.
Co., 6 U. C. Q B. 319.
In these and other like cases, the law presumed that the parties,
from the very nature of things, must have contemplated the natural
and physical consequences resulting from the peril insured against.
So in this case, the appellee is not only liable for the damages to
the ship from actualcombustion, but also for damages to the vessel,
resulting directly from the means used to extinguish the fire. But
the liability of the insurer arising in cases where the peril insured
against has been the proximate cause of the loss, has never been
held to cover damages to other property not insured by the policy.
If, then, the appellant is entitled to recover in this suit, it must
be upon the ground that the law of general average, by which he
was obliged to contribute to the loss sustained by the cargo, constitutes and forms a part of the risk assumed by the appellee. Fire
policies, it is well known, have been in existence for centuries, and
it is but fair to presume that cases like the present, where the
vessel has been insured by such policies, and the cargo insured
under marine policies, must have frequently occurred; and yet no
case has been found in which it has been held that the fire policy
must contribute to .the loss sustained by the cargo. Not only this,
but the proof in the record shows that the usage and laws recognised by mercantile men, and by which such policies are construed,
are all against this contention. In determining for the first time a
question arising upon insurance, such usage and laws are entitled
to weight, not only because they are approved and sanctioned by
practical and sagacious men, in regard to a subject-matter in which
they are alike interested, but also because the parties must be presumed to have contracted with reference to them. In fact, it has
been said that the whole law of insurance has done little else than
to adopt such laws and usages, and to give to them the force of
authority.
In the absence, then, of any authority to support the appellant's
contention, let us see whether it can be supported on principle.
The -whole scope and object and purposes of afirepolie y are dif-
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ferent from those of a marine policy. By the former, the insurer
agrees to indemnify against loss by fire. That is the only peril for
the loss by which he agrees to become responsible, and we have no
right to enlarge the contract or to extend the risk by implication.
By a marine policy, the underwriter engages to pay not only the
loss or damage to the thing insured, but also to reimburse the
owner all sums paid by him under the laws of general average.
General average is a contribution by all the parties in a sea adventure, to a loss sustained for the common benefit of all.
In such cases, where any sacrifice is deliberately and voluntarily
made, or any expense is fairly and bond fide incurred, to prevent
total loss or some greater disaster, it is but just and right that the
sacrifice or expense should be borne relatively by the owner of the
ship, freight and cargo, to the end that the loss may fall equally
upon all the parties in interest: Birkley v. Presgrave,1 East 228 ;
Hallett v. Wigram, 9 C. B. 580; Fletcher v. Alexander, 37 L. J.
(C. P.) 196; L. R., 3 C. P. 380.
For risks thus assumed, and which may be said to be co-extensive with the perils of the sea, embracing general average, salvage
and abandonment, the insured pays a premium more than five
times greater than the premium against loss by fire alone.
If the appellant desired protection- against the risk of general
average, or against other perils of the sea, he should have insured
under a marine policy. If he preferred to insure at a lower rate
of premium, and to take upon himself all risks, other than loss by
fire, lie has no reason to complain because the insured refuses to
reimburse him for a loss not covered by the policy, and which, by
the well-settled law of insurance, constituted no part of the contract between the parties.
In the many cases relied on by the counsel for the appellant, the
questions considered and decided arose on marine policies, under
which the right and obligations of the parties are altogether different from those belonging and incident to afire policy.
The policy sued on in this case limits the liability of the appellee
to losses to the steamer itself by fire, and upon such a policy the
appellant is not entitled, either upon principle or upon authority,
to recover the amount which by the law of general average he was
obliged, as owner of the vessel, to contribute to the cargo, even
though the damages to the cargo were occasioned by the means
used to extinguish the fire in the vessel.

